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Abstract 
 
TAMAR MALLOY: Apolitics of Acknowledgement: (In)Action in Patchen Markell’s Bound 
by Recognition 
(Under the direction of Jeff Spinner-Halev) 
 
 
 In Bound by Recognition Patchen Markell relocates interactions that confer respect, 
moving from a state-centered politics of recognition to a politics of acknowledgement based 
primarily on individuals’ acceptance of their own human finitude. I argue that, while 
engaging and promising, Markell’s theory lacks a politics and, therefore, the potential to 
create far-reaching social change. In support of this claim I examine obstacles to realizing a 
politics of acknowledgement, Markell’s anachronistic focus on Jewish emancipation in 
Prussia, and the unique advantages of an antagonistic, state-based politics of recognition, 
with particular attention to gay rights movements in the United States. I conclude that 
Markell’s warnings about the danger of recognition are exaggerated, and that while a politics 
of acknowledgement might usefully inform political practice it cannot provide psychic or 
material benefits on par with those that might be gained through a politics of recognition.   
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Introduction 
Criticisms of recognition politics are numerous. It is too abstract, too detached from 
the material conditions of daily life, does too much to distract from efforts to redistribute, 
seeks remedies that are too purely symbolic, it oversimplifies structures of power, it brings 
groups into irresolvable struggles for sovereignty, it essentializes, it is too dependent on 
collective identities, it is somehow inauthentic.
1
 These critiques are serious and, if correct, 
undermine the possibility that a politics of recognition could function towards a mutual 
multicultural recognition that allows people to be seen by others as valid and valuable on 
their own terms. Yet that end continues to be an attractive one for those who study 
multiculturalism, feminism, democracy, and a host of other disciplines relevant to life in an 
ever-expanding world. And to settle for less than a mutual respect would be to fall short of 
recognition’s promise and to disappoint attempts to ameliorate those enduring injustices that 
are so frequently and troublingly at issue in contemporary states.
2
  
Patchen Markell’s alternative, a politics of acknowledgement, is appealing on a 
number of counts. In encouraging people to look inwards, Markell circumvents critiques of 
recognition that are predicated on a belief that offering recognition pretends to sovereignty, 
                                                     
1
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or that judging others across cultures promotes one set of cultural values above others, or that 
as a nexus of power the state can abuse its ability to confer or deny recognition. Markell’s 
argument in favor of acknowledgement offers a clear and thoughtful elucidation of some of 
the issues most deeply and definitionally attached to a politics of recognition and shows 
much promise as an approach to moving beyond the inter- and intragroup power struggles 
that have become synonymous with attempts to pursue recognition on a case-by-case basis. 
By placing the burden of action on those who would confer recognition instead of the groups 
seeking it, by moving the action of recognition from the interpersonal to the internal and 
personal, Markell – quite brilliantly – mitigates elements of judgment and antagonism that 
undermine politics of recognition. Furthermore, Markell’s politics of acknowledgment is 
built on change that could be tangible, that we might make every day, in every interaction, 
and that still, in the aggregate, could reshape the ways we think about, look at, and talk to 
each other. 
Yet Markell’s argument relies heavily on anachronisms and ambiguities that weaken, 
perhaps fatally, his politics of acknowledgement. He does not question the disparate starting 
points from which people may be asked to relinquish their desire for control. He relies on a 
largely outdated notion of the state as monarchical and purely paternalistic, as deriving 
sovereignty from the coercive and one-sided exercise of power rather than from an electorate 
that can make demands on those who govern, and thereby ignores the positive possibilities of 
antagonism. He fails to distinguish between the types of recognition demands that different 
groups make and the various responses that the state can offer. He also does not acknowledge 
the challenges inherent in a politics of acknowledgement, which asks citizens to 
fundamentally reorganize their lives politically, emotionally, and logistically. If realized, 
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these failings would leave those who are most in need of positive political change without 
recourse. As appealing as Markell’s approach may be, he strays so far from the realms of 
contentious politics as to be both practically unrealistic and theoretically muddled.  
  
Understanding Acknowledgement  
Operating as an alternative to a politics of recognition, Patchen Markell’s politics of 
acknowledgement relocates interactions that confer or deny respect, placing the onus on non-
state actors who are asked to recognize their own limitations rather than judging those around 
them. His emphasis on micro-level power and individual self-awareness offers a 
substantively different perspective on the process of recognition, emphasizing mutuality over 
hierarchies and individual interactions over institutionalized categorizations. While Markell’s 
approach offers much more room for nuance and flexibility than do other accounts of the 
struggle for mutual respect, his focus on the interpersonal comes with some liabilities.  
Markell opens Bound by Recognition with a series of anecdotes that describe 
recognition as a phenomenon occurring primarily through interactions between individuals. 
He recounts a friendly or desirous glance between two people, the offering of a seat on the 
bus, and interactions between coworkers. Even when the state is present, his focus is on the 
individual agents who confer or deny recognition or who assess their social position within 
the confines of state regulation, as when Markell describes a driver “suspended in mistrust” 
while waiting for police to run his or her record, a couple joined in contemplation of the 
possibilities foreclosed by the exclusivity of marriage laws, and a voter waiting for a 
volunteer to find his or her name in the voting rolls.
3
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This focus on individual actors is not borne of an assumption that the state is 
inefficacious or unimportant. On the contrary, Markell explicitly acknowledges the “real 
power” of the state, which “organizes power in a certain way, concentrating certain 
capacities in specific places, groups, and institutions.”
4
 This construction imbues the state 
with tremendous power – but not as a set of laws or bureaucratic offices. Instead, Markell’s 
state is “a set of social institutions that is also among the central objects of identification onto 
which people displace, and through which they pursue, the desire for independent and 
masterful agency.”
5
 Rather than being sources of power, Markell’s state derives its 
dominance from people’s deference to it.  Each person contributes to state authority by 
recognizing the state’s decisions, and is in turn regulated by the same authoritative power 
they have helped to cement.  
The state’s cooptation of and reliance on individuals’ power makes it immediately 
suspect as a site for recognition. Attempts to glean recognition from the state reinforce its 
legitimacy and yield agency to those institutions, thereby empowering the groups or 
individuals behind them who seek to maintain sovereignty.
 6
  This cycle, in which groups 
seeking recognition grant power to the state – and in so doing confirm their position as 
relatively powerless subjects – is, for Markell, both unavoidable and dangerous. If 
approaching the state is an implicit agreement to recognize state decisions as legitimate even 
if they are unfavorable, if the very act of approaching the state has allowed groups with 
powerful social positions to subvert or mischaracterize requests for recognition, then 
appealing to the state is very dangerous indeed. If, as Markell suggests, simply engaging the 
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state creates a danger of misrecognition or denied recognition, it is smart to construct a 
theory of recognition that does not reinscribe state power, and that instead treats the state 
with suspicion and keeps it at arm’s length. 
In lieu of looking to legislatures, bureaucracies, judiciaries, or other state bodies to 
ameliorate the harms of misrecognition, Markell’s politics of acknowledgement builds a 
theory of recognition that is dependent first, perhaps entirely, on internal awareness. Positing 
that the core problem of misrecognition, both between individuals and through the state, is 
individuals’ desire to create and maintain a false sense of personal sovereignty, Markell 
proposes a solution that presses individuals to recognize their own finitude. We are all 
equally vulnerable to death, to loss, to judgment. Rather than recognizing these 
vulnerabilities as universal we, according to Markell, seek to create an illusion of personal 
sovereignty. Since controlling the threads of fate is beyond our ability, we seek “ways of 
patterning and arranging the world that allow some people and groups to enjoy a semblance 
of sovereign agency at others’ expense.”
7
 Inequality stems from this false pursuit of pseudo-
independence, from a process wherein those with socially strong positions proceed to – both 
through interpersonal interactions and through state channels – place the burden of 
vulnerability unevenly on those who lack the power to resist. 
With the state ruled out as a site of action, Markell calls for individuals to look 
inward, to acknowledge their own “practical limits in the face of an unpredictable and 
contingent future”, which “involves coming to terms with, rather than vainly attempting to 
overcome, the risk of conflict, hostility, misunderstanding, opacity, and alienation that 
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characterizes life among others.” 
8
 This acknowledgement – not of each other, but of our own 
fragility – will ameliorate the injustices usually associated with misrecognition by 
recognizing that “the underlying forms of desire and motivation that sustain and are sustained 
by unjust social arrangements…are supported by structures of desire that are not in the first 
instance about others”.
9
 Once we acknowledge that we do not need to control others, and that 
attempting to do so will not help us realize our desires or exile our vulnerabilities, we can 
move towards an interpersonal recognition that is more realistic than the “appealing” but 
“also impossible, even incoherent” “ideal of mutual recognition.”
10
 
There is much to recommend Markell’s critique of recognition. He is likely right 
about the degree to which individuals – particularly individuals in developed Western nations 
– pursue individual sovereignty. Markell is probably also correct that people exercise control 
over others in an attempt to create illusions of sovereignty. Everyday social life gives us 
plenty of examples of this, whether it’s wielding economic power to get others to complete 
undesirable or unpleasant tasks for us (hiring someone to clean the house, ordering dinner, 
pulling into a full service gas station on a cold day) or engaging in acts of psychic harm 
intended to validate our choices at the expense of others (criticizing someone’s manners, 
sartorial choices, or professional path with the intent of affirming our choices as superior). 
And the state’s incredible power has undeniably been used to enslave, ghettoize, demean, and 
disadvantage certain groups, usually in the service of those with the social and economic 
power needed to obtain (or lobby those already in) governmental office. Historically 
empowered groups and individuals have, as Markell suggests, used appeals from 
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disadvantaged groups to subvert requests for recognition, whether by deeming groups 
“separate but equal” and thereby ensuring economic and political disadvantage
11
 or by using 
protectionist logic to support stereotypes, as with gender-specific labor laws and social 
welfare programs.
12
  
But Markell’s construction of the state leaves little room, if any, to account for the 
positive change that has occurred as a result of appeals to government, or the ability of 
disadvantaged groups to gain access to state apparatuses. It also leaves groups without a clear 
path when it comes to advocating for change in the social order. These liabilities, both 
practical and theoretical, derive from a characterization of the state that is more limited and 
exclusive than is often the case in modern liberal democracies. By mischaracterizing the state 
Markell also avoids confronting the many challenges that come with asking people to 
voluntarily cede the personal power that defines and enriches their lives and thereby neglects 
a thorough examination of the potential dangers of abandoning the antagonistic political 
exchanges that come with accounts of recognition.  
 
The (Im)Possibility of Acknowledgement  
Markell’s politics of acknowledgment avoids granting power to potentially 
oppressive state apparatuses. But the alternative it provides may be of little assistance to 
those suffering materially and psychically from unjust social arrangements. 
Acknowledgement requires, after all, that those with power willingly recognize that the 
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power they wield is false and cede the control they exert over others. While Markell is 
undoubtedly correct that no one is capable of controlling all circumstances, the sovereignty 
that some are able to exert over their lives is not entirely illusory.  Markell neglects the ways 
in which personal sovereignty is not only psychological but material, resulting in habits of 
domination that structure lives, and will not be easily changed.  
The idea that people will freely choose to engage in the deep self-reflection that can 
create an awareness of human finitude and that they will then choose to restructure their lives 
in order to relinquish their personal power is near-fantastical. This is true for those powerful 
elites who are most steeped in the sort of privilege that can create an appearance of 
autonomy. It is also true for the great majority of people who both oppress and are oppressed, 
who already live with precariousness and vulnerability and who – because a politics of 
acknowledgement would have to be far-reaching to work at all – Markell would ask to forego 
the striving for security that sustains hope in the face of adversity. It is hard to believe that 
people in either case would relinquish control without some external motivation. 
Conventional politics supplies this motivation by creating venues through which groups can 
assert and fight for their material and psychological needs, and can thereby apply pressure to 
those who would not otherwise need to consider their interests. Without the mechanisms of 
the state those most in need of assistance are left endlessly waiting for a remedy that may 
never arrive.  
Markell’s treatment of personal sovereignty conceives of interpersonal exercises of 
control as rooted in a psychological resistance to vulnerability. To live in accordance with a 
politics of acknowledgement means “accepting that the existence of others – as yet 
unspecified, indeterminate others – makes unpredictability and lack of mastery into 
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unavoidable conditions of human agency.”
13
 To do this we must “refuse something, restrain 
an impulse, forego an advantage, evade a recognition.”
14
 Substituting acknowledgement for 
recognition “might involve translating democracy’s egalitarian impulses into a new idiom in 
which risk, loss, and vulnerability are seen as constitutive features of political life rather than 
as burdens to be overcome once and for all”.
15
 But Bound by Recognition does not offer any 
specific course of action to ameliorate enduring injustices. Acknowledgement instead asks 
that people let go of their political demands which, for Markell, will otherwise lead to 
escalation in an unwinnable race for domination. Instead, acknowledgement would require 
that people – even those who are dominated as well as dominating, who are already 
intimately familiar with finitude and vulnerability – refuse the urge to make the cultural, 
economic, or political demands that are often seen as part and parcel of demands for 
recognition, lest they oppress others in the process. As a result, Markell’s emphasis on giving 
or welcoming, as opposed to demanding, does not open many concrete possibilities. Instead, 
it seems to ask that everyone demand less of others while waiting for the powerful to come to 
a place of welcoming, which is in turn dependent on a realization that a normative ideal of 
justice and equality should outweigh selfish and endless (and therefore unattainable) desires 
for control.  
There is little reason to believe that those who have come to enjoy the psychological 
comfort of sovereignty, illusory or otherwise, would willingly trade that state of mind for an 
acceptance of loss and risk. This is especially true when, as Markell writes, “people who are 
able to identify relatively unproblematically with the ‘larger’ society’ and its institutions are 
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also typically better able to set the terms under which any exchange of recognition with less 
powerful and more vulnerable others will occur, making their own desires and needs into 
nonnegotiable items.”
16
 Acknowledgement is, then, contingent upon the individual 
realizations of society’s most powerful, even though Markell’s politics of acknowledgement 
includes no mechanism for convincing people to prioritize social justice, or to engage with 
justice as a consideration. 
This lack of a mechanism is especially important when considering the breadth and 
depth of people’s attachment to the pursuit and experience of individual sovereignty. Contra 
Markell, the enjoyment of personal sovereignty is not strictly psychological. Those with 
power may, in a material sense, bend the world to their will. The places where people spend 
their days – homes, cars, offices – may be designed to taste. Consumer goods from around 
the world can be delivered to one’s door. Unpleasant tasks – cleaning, laundering, food 
preparation – may be outsourced to paid help. For those with economic means a sense of 
psychological control may not only be generated from ongoing acceptance, but from the real, 
everyday experience of having tasks accomplished without seeing or partaking in the labor 
involved. Toilets may be cleaned, meals may appear, clothes may become wearable once 
more, all effortlessly and on demand, thereby creating the illusion that the world really is 
controllable, that personal sovereignty is achievable. Even in life-or-death realms, the 
privileged are likely to live lives that are longer and both physically and psychologically 
healthier and are less likely to face the moments of vulnerability, including impacts on family 
and employment, that come with low socioeconomic status.
17
 Those with sufficient financial 
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and social resources may also be able to plan such that they can be assured that their 
sovereignty can extend even beyond death, whether through pre-established funeral 
arrangements, plans for descendants’ financial health, or for charitable or political donation 
through trusts or planned estates. From the cradle to the grave, domination is not only a 
psychological state but a series of habits. And these habits of domination are so deeply 
engrained – and so deeply reliant on unequal relations of production, which make low cost 
goods and labor more widely accessible – that even those who might try would find it 
difficult to eliminate oppressive behavior from their daily routines.  
This tradeoff – material comfort and psychological security versus a more just and 
respectful world – is not unusual, not a question of a few super-elites relinquishing yachts 
and private jets. Most, if not all, people in the developed world engage in some practices that 
create a sense of personal sovereignty. These may be as simple and central to daily life as 
driving your car to your destination and being able to choose your route and timeframe, or 
locking the door to your home to maximize your ability to control who you interact with and 
who has use of your things. Relinquishing the practices that Markell implicitly asks people to 
refuse, restrain, and forego may lead to a materially and psychologically different quality of 
life. For those who are starting out in tenuous positions, things might quickly become unsafe. 
Yet Markell remains unclear about the amount of risk that any one person should be willing 
to tolerate, and whether their starting position in society affects the degree to which they 
should relinquish the pursuit of autonomy. If it is difficult to imagine the powerful ceding 
their psychological ground it is near impossible to imagine people who already live 
precariously choosing to give up material comfort in the interest of an abstract principle. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
et al., “Socioeconomic Status and Health: The Challenge of the Gradient.” American Psychologist, Vol. 49, No. 
1 (Jan., 1994), pp. 15-24.  
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There is, in short, little reason to think that those who benefit from unequal social 
arrangements will spontaneously come to the conclusion that they should willingly surrender 
the material and psychological comforts, derived from historical and global inequality, that 
make life relatively controlled and comfortable. 
Furthermore, if this transformation were to take place, it would be less a politics than 
a job for individual psychotherapists and yoga instructors. Even someone who was willing to 
relinquish the material and psychological pursuit of control would likely find the task 
exceedingly difficult. Forgoing privilege and embracing finitude would require a near-total 
re-imagination of self. This type of personal discovery must be sought and chosen, and even 
then would be difficult to achieve without a deep well of emotional and material resources. 
Outside of a conventional political discourse there would be few ways to push people on a 
large scale to embrace their mortality and publicly acknowledge that their own needs are not 
as important as those of others. There is no reason to believe that those who enjoy a very 
convincing simulacrum of personal sovereignty – let alone the many more who cling to a 
precarious semblance of same – will one day wake up and come to the conclusion that it’s 
time to contemplate their own powerlessness for the sake of people they don’t know or in the 
service of an abstract concept of justice. And even those who might do this will find that 
dominance is not an object that can be let go of, but a constellation of habits and views that 
infuses all parts of daily life.  
Embracing a politics of acknowledgement, then, is not only a question of deciding to 
be more just or deciding to be humble, but a process of questioning everything that is 
familiar and reliable. Markell encourages this, but does not ask: Do you have the emotional 
support needed to engage in a contemplation of mortality? Do you have the money to avoid 
13 
 
buying clothes and food whose production relies on international and interpersonal 
domination? Do you have a community that can help you understand how the ways you 
interact with others may be harmful to them? Can you afford to stop advocating for your own 
political needs? Can you trust that you will remain safe if you stop pushing others to change 
their behavior towards you? Can you trust, ultimately, that others will lower their guards and 
make the same concessions? Or will a politics of acknowledgement leave you more 
vulnerable, more psychologically naked and materially deprived than those around you? Will 
it leave you with enough internal resource to be welcoming of others? Will it leave you with 
fewer critical resources than you had – or could have had – if you had continued to fight for 
recognition?  
 
Acknowledgement: The Waiting Game?  
That Markell’s politics of acknowledgement relies so heavily on voluntary and 
unlikely actions leaves little recourse for those groups most in need of action. Though 
political institutions have historically provided a venue through which groups could make 
demands of those in power, Markell’s vision of a politics of acknowledgement excludes these 
bodies. He writes that: 
if there is a ‘politics’ to the idea of acknowledgment, it…involves 
criticizing the ways in which our conceptual frames, modes of 
identification, and animating political visions not only obscure the 
conditions of politics but do so in ways that reinforce inegalitarian 
distributions of power and vulnerability; it involves articulating different 
political imaginaries…and it involves reflexively examining, criticizing, 
and altering the institutional and practical forms through which our 
political imaginaries are reproduced.
18
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But there are few venues for the kind of reflection Markell imagines. Even when spaces like 
this do exist (at least ostensibly) outside of the state – fraternal or sororal organizations, 
sporting groups, university or community classes, corporate managerial retreats – those who 
enter them have little impetus to engage in the kind of difficult, empathetic conversation that 
a “politics” of acknowledgement demands. These groups are also likely to be homophilous, 
making it difficult to imagine how alternative viewpoints would be introduced, or why group 
members would be moved to take up this task.
 19
 Even if dialog does occur, the possibilities 
for action are unclear.  To be effective, Markell says that new political imaginaries must 
replace old imperatives and norms. This is a tall order, especially if it is to occur in a nation 
with millions of citizens, and especially if the state and traditional political activities – 
protest, lobbying, canvassing – are off-limits to activists. 
In his response to a symposium on Bound by Recognition, Markell says that a politics 
of acknowledgement can be useful because “it involves reflexively examining, criticizing, 
and altering the institutional and practical forms…which help orient us in political life”
20
  
But Markell does not explain how this reorientation will occur. Nor does he account for the 
asymmetry of political life, for the possibility that some will be more willing and able than 
others to practice a politics of acknowledgement. As a result, he does not seem to provide an 
alternative to waiting for individual realizations to occur. Without the involvement of state 
apparatuses there is no clear recourse for those who are most desperately in need of change. 
It is unclear where they would go to be heard, or how they would know to go there, or how 
they would get others to listen. While a conversation on a therapist’s couch or in an Elks 
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meeting might articulate more vulnerable and humble political imaginaries it will only 
impact those who seek it out or choose to pay attention to it. The legal and social power of 
governmental bodies has greater reach and gives these dialogues greater impact, therein 
creating more meaningful incentives for those who are otherwise reluctant or resistant. Any 
number of conversations, consciousness raising groups, or community conversations 
intended to challenge power structures or create new political imaginaries could still fail to 
change the minds of those who are entrenched in prejudicial beliefs. Laws and political 
conversations may also fail at this. However, no amount of discussion – even successful 
discussion – can levy the power of anti-discrimination laws attached to fines and penalties or 
the conceptual weight of state approval. Nor can atomistic private action offer a guarantee to 
those who do or would benefit from state protection in non-state settings; it is difficult to 
imagine any uniform protection against prejudicial hiring or workplace treatment or housing 
discrimination developing out of a politics of acknowledgement.  
Yet Markell seeks to exclude the state from his (increasingly thin) politics of 
acknowledgement. He paints appeals to the state as dangerous because they reinscribe and 
channel sovereign power that is predicated on exclusion, because “to appeal to the state for 
the recognition of one’s own identity – to present oneself as knowable – is already to offer 
the state the reciprocal recognition of its sovereignty that it demands.”
21
 Markell is right that 
a politics of acknowledgement need not reinforce pre-existing structures of power or offer 
the state more power.  
But a state will still be needed to make sure that citizens are protected from 
international threats, that roads are paved, that food and medication are not toxic. That state, 
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even if it operated in a pared-down form, will continue to wield power, and those living 
within it will be affected by that power regardless of their engagement with governmental 
bodies. Markell seems to implicitly concede that engaging with the state will, at some point 
and in some way, be necessary for those living within its borders, at least inasmuch as 
orientation within political life is at issue in a politics of acknowledgement.
22
 However, 
acknowledgement does not give those actors who are denied recognition or experiencing 
misrecognition an alternative non-state channel through which to engage those with whom 
they share a state, and therefore denies them any plan of action for facilitating a change in 
their own circumstances.  
In recent history, engagement with the state has proven to be a useful tool, and 
certainly the most tangible, for disadvantaged groups seeking to change social orders. 
Minority groups have formed relationships with state agents and have learned to direct their 
resources towards specific actors or levels of government. Though it might call state power 
into question, refusing to treat the state as a political nexus (as Markell suggests) would 
require an investment in re-education and re-organization that groups seeking recognition can 
hardly afford. Even if advocacy groups were successful in re-orienting themselves towards 
inspiring the privileged to rethink their psychological and material comfort on purely 
normative grounds, they might be expected to have a hard time finding an audience. Groups’ 
recourse to the state is much more immediate and tangible. State institutions can be 
structured to make political representatives or bureaucracies at least somewhat responsive to 
constituent needs, whether through elections, public comment periods, or investment in 
interest group funding and endorsements. And, especially when these access points are even 
nominally open to all, interest groups have used them to leverage their collective power 
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against legislators and other political groups who would not otherwise have a reason to 
devote mental energy to the desires of the marginalized. Political movements may also gain 
enough cultural traction to encourage private individuals to rethink their views about 
particular groups, whereas they would have no reason to reconsider their views – let alone 
embark on a difficult and deeply personal project like that Markell demands – without that 
prompting. Markell’s approach would move so far away from this sort of traditional politics 
that groups seeking recognition would likely be left in perpetual suspense, knocking on doors 
that have no reason to open, with a message that need not be heard.  
Interestingly, this potential result replicates the dynamic that Markell is so critical of 
in his study of Jewish Emancipation, wherein the psychological states and political 
perceptions of those already in power matter most, and can be exercised arbitrarily. Waiting 
indefinitely for the powerful to accept their finitude and accepting that arbitrary and 
voluntary personal acknowledgement will rule the political day are both unacceptable 
solutions for those who suffer daily from the psychic pain of exclusion and derision, and the 
material effects of same. Waiting should be similarly unsatisfactory for those who, like 
Markell, claim a normative interest in creating a more just world – especially when 
engagement with the state may be less hazardous than Markell suggests.  
 
Mischaracterizing the State    
While democratic institutions are deeply imperfect, history does show that it is 
possible for organized interests to infiltrate both the bodies that govern and their agendas, to 
snatch some of that sovereign power that Markell is afraid of reinscribing. A politics – and a 
more interactive, antagonistic, engaged politics than the one Markell proposes – is necessary 
18 
 
if justice is to be extricated from governmental systems that subsist on and perpetuate 
inequality. Fortunately, a politics that engages the state might not be so dangerous if 
Markell’s assumptions – that the state regulates identity to control it, and that engaging the 
state will result in narrowly cast pictures of identity – don’t tell the whole story.  
Markell’s model of the state is limited in large part because it is drawn from a 
peculiar and anachronistic model – the emancipation of Prussian Jews in the early 19
th
 
century. Based on this example, Markell constructs the state as a static consumer of 
sovereignty. But to say that the Prussian Empire was different from modern liberal 
democracies is an understatement at best. The Prussian Empire evinced no concern with 
righting historical wrongs or creating equal access for its subjects. Its central aim had much 
more to do with consolidating power than with ensuring the psychic or financial health of 
Prussians, Jewish or otherwise.
23
 Defenses of Jewish emancipation occurred “not (as is 
sometimes suggested) in the context of a defense of universal human rights, but rather in the 
course of a psychological argument about how the state might most effectively weaken the 
parochial ties among Jews and convert them into loyal German citizens.”
 24
 Jewish 
emancipation was not strictly, or even primarily, an attempt to correct historical injustice or 
expand rights in line with changing normative judgments about the reach of justice. Rather, it 
was a political attempt to count and regulate Jews, and a conditional offer of civil freedoms 
that required Jews to recast or abandon social and religious institutions in exchange for a 
paltry and contingent recognition.
25
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Prussian Jews did appeal to Kaiser Wilhem III and, as Markell suggests, did so in 
ways intended to affirm state sovereignty. Markell cites a letter from the Jewish community 
of Königsberg to the Kaiser, which praises his wisdom and affirms their subject position: 
“Your eternal royal Majesty’s noble and wise orders and reforms fill every subject of the 
Prussian state with love, awe, and joyful anticipation; therefore, the members of a people 
that…has felt itself besieged and neglected, do venture to have resort to your eternal royal 
Majesty’s good sentiments, full of hope and confidence.”
26
 This tactic can hardly be 
surprising, given the precarious position of Jews across Europe and – importantly – the lack 
of institutions that gave them any recourse in the face of unjust state decisions. It is on this 
model that Markell paints the state as a static consumer of sovereignty which will absorb the 
power of groups who appeal to it, rendering them powerless to resist the state’s authority and 
affecting both their legal status and self-image as “the modern state is…one of the central 
objects of identification onto which persons displace, and through which they pursue, the 
desire for independent and masterful agency.”
27
 
This theory holds true in the case of the Prussian example. The extension of rights to 
Prussian Jews was piecemeal and self-serving. Jews were granted the right to hold public 
office, and then denied it.
28
 The ability to hold academic positions was extended as part of 
the Edict of 1812, only to be repealed in 1822.
29
 To earn rights Jewish families had to – 
counter to Jewish traditions – take on fixed family names, agree to conduct their commercial 
and state business in German or another living language, and sign their names in Gothic or 
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Latin script.
30
 By design, Jewish people lacked any official recourse when these rights were 
repealed. Their inclusion was “not derived, and did not purport to be derived, from first 
political and moral, let alone universal, principles. Prussian reforms were pragmatic and 
opportunistic. They were intended to maximize and mobilize the resources of the state and 
were governed by what its master and his loyal servants considered expedient, not just.”
31
  
Prussian Emancipation is a strategically well-chosen example on Markell’s part. It 
adheres closely to the Hegelian readings of recognition that are clearly a part of Markell’s 
intellectual lineage. Markell likens the roles of state and recognition-seeker to that of Hegel’s 
master and slave. The example succeeds in suggesting that freedom-from is superior to a 
state-conferred freedom-to, and demonstrates the pitfalls of endorsing and depending on a 
state that absorbs sovereignty, accepting recognition without being accountable to any 
mechanism of reciprocity. However, it is not a good example of how recognition-seeking 
interactions with the state might take shape in modern liberal democracies, where the 
construction of both procedural and substantive rights gives groups suffering from enduring 
injustice the ability to build upon their victories in ways that Hegel would have been hard 
pressed to imagine.  
Unlike Prussia, many modern states do evince a normative interest in increasing 
equality for equality’s sake.  While not naming recognition per se many aim to limit the 
degree to which citizens experience subjugation, legally and conceptually through 
enumerated civil and human rights and more materially through social welfare programs. 
Civil rights laws and jurisprudence similarly put states’ power behind normative judgments 
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about justice and equality. In addition to individual states’ commitment to visions of equality 
and recognition, many nations are signatories to international human rights treaties, 
suggesting that the pursuit of at least a basic adherence to human rights principles is 
understood as a condition of international engagement.
32
 Many of these human rights 
principles – the universal right to nationality, free movement, family, religion, free thought, 
expression, employment, rest, participation in cultural life, and protection even in times of 
war – hold closely to what is required for the realization of recognition.
33
 That nations sign 
these protocols, and that they experience international pressure to uphold them, speaks to an 
increasingly widespread agreement on the importance of individual rights and group rights – 
including cultural rights – that was not of concern to Prussian officials.  
While both domestic and international laws are, in practice, ignored or selectively 
enforced with unfortunate frequency, they provide a standard to which the populations of 
modern liberal democracies can hold officials who would otherwise deny recognition. The 
violation or unequal application of these normative stances can be taken as grounds for 
protest or political dissent. Even if (or when) citizens’ demands are dismissed, the perception 
that agency can be exercised in seeking rights suggests that social justice is not a privilege or 
a gift, but a right to be demanded and negotiated.  Citizens seeking rights need not do so 
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through supplication to an all-powerful ruler, as was the case for Jewish people in the 19
th
 
century.  
Markell’s anachronistic example also makes assumptions about the perceived 
audience for recognition requests. Markell may be right that the state levels its “needy and 
suspicious gaze” at members of minority groups. But the meaning of that gaze is altered 
when it is not the paternalistic and singular eye of a monarch. Instead, the contemporary 
democratic state looks at its members with a shifting aggregation of gazes – an increasing 
number of which belong to those who are not part of the historical majority and whose 
inclusion changes the agendas that determine state action.
34
 The liberal democratic republic 
does not, itself, offer recognition or possess a gaze that exists outside of its component parts. 
Rather, it is the conduit through which citizens gaze at each other, and – importantly – gaze 
back. While this does make the state, as per Markell’s critique of recognition, dependent on 
citizens’ deference, governmental bodies are also held accountable to those who supply their 
social meaning and sovereign power. It is no longer simply a case of majority-white, male, 
Christian governments being magnanimous towards subjects who are “other” – as is the case 
in Markell’s example of Jewish emancipation – but of non-white, non-male, non-Christian 
citizens entering state apparatuses and changing conversations from within the state.  
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Markell continues to suggest that “the state participates in and reconfigures, but by no 
means transcends, the conflictual and potentially unjust dynamics of recognition.”
35
 This 
inability to transcend dynamics of recognition is worthy of more attention than Markell gives 
it. In a modern context it should denote the ways in which few states can still act with the 
individualistic independence afforded to a politically calculating Kaiser, the way in which the 
yielding of sovereign power to the legislators, judges, and bureaucrats who constitute the 
state is often conditional and can be revoked if members of government do not meet with the 
approval of those who put them into power. In these cases, it may not be as problematic as 
Markell suggests for a government to engage in a conflictual dynamics of recognition, 
especially when democratic forms of government may mean that conflict holds governments 
to higher ideals in ways that would have unimaginable to Prussian subjects. 
Institutional structures are still, in practice, biased. There are relatively few women 
and minorities in most governmental bodies, and those who most need meaningful protection 
may lack the political power to provide it for themselves. But when groups demand 
recognition from liberal democratic states they are demanding it from their fellow citizens 
and, as they gain enfranchisement, from themselves. It is shortsighted to ask that the state 
remove itself when state apparatuses can be changed to include diverse actors who are likely 
to have either a procedural or substantive investment in guaranteeing rights. Citizens of a 
liberal democracy have the ability to vote politicians out of office, to form interest groups, 
and to work on changing cultural norms. All of this makes the relationship between citizens 
and their state significantly different from the relationship between subjects and their Kaiser. 
In a modern liberal state – unlike the Prussian Empire – citizens can and do make demands 
on political actors and institutions. Through protest, political organization, the wielding of 
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interest group money and pressure, participation in cultural discourse, and attempts to move 
public opinion, those in need of recognition may be able to hold the state responsible for its 
failings. Responsive liberal democratic states can adjust to evolving and complex requests for 
recognition by including those who seek recognition in the decision-making process.  
Once able to enter state apparatuses, members of minority groups can work to ensure 
that depictions of their needs are not one-dimensional or static – that they will not be, as 
Markell fears, bound by recognition. The state itself, and the process by which recognition is 
granted, can be made inclusive, can become a useful site for and tool in struggles for 
recognition without consigning groups to misrecognition. There is little reason to believe that 
liberal democratic states are destined to create “unjust relations of inequality, asymmetrical 
dependence, and exploitation among people, groups, and institutions.”
36
 This may have been 
true for Jews facing the monolithic Prussian empire, but groups seeking recognition from 
dramatically different states will not necessarily meet with the same subjection and 
cooptation of power that defined the Jewish struggle for emancipation.  
 
Different Identities, Different Recognitions  
Markell’s reluctance about affirming and increasing state power is not solely based on 
the example of Jewish emancipation; he is also more broadly concerned that state recognition 
will have a binding effect. He writes that: “by making the protection of the state, the 
distribution of resources, and the institutionalization of rights dependent upon one’s 
recognizability as the bearer of an identity, the politics of multicultural recognition risks 
subjecting the very people whose agency it strives to enhance to powerful forces of 
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normalization, binding them ever more closely to who they are.”
37
 Markell’s view of 
recognition here is needlessly narrow. It seems to assume that individuals are bearers of only 
one unified cultural identity that the state will be able to constrain in uniform ways, that there 
are no forces outside of the state that would push back against attempts to restrict or flatten 
identity, and that the state will be able to succeed in enforcing processes of normalization 
without finding that norms are changed by the process of inclusion. These implicit claims are 
deeply problematic. There is no single way to be part of a culture. Even within especially 
restrictive cultural groups men and women, children and adults, single and coupled people 
tend to have different cultural roles and would, therefore, respond differently to state 
restrictions.
38
 Cultures are not – maybe cannot be – the same thing to all members. Nor can 
members ever be only one thing. Even when, to take Markell’s own example, the Prussian 
Empire recognized “Jews” it did not, could not, create one single template for Jewish identity 
or create a set of laws that had an identical impact on men, who faced more direct economic 
and legal pressure to learn new languages and who were more likely to be effect by laws 
about holding office, and women. In spite of the conditional recognition allowed to Jews in 
Prussia, there was no singular Jewish role. The state could expand or restrict possibilities, but 
it could not force members of the group to adhere more closely or singularly to their 
Jewishness and could not stop Jewish identity from being modified by gender, age, or 
coupled-ness.  
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Markell’s assumption of singularity overlooks the many different ways in which 
people can demand recognition, and the many different ends they have in mind, both as 
individuals and as group members. To say that the state will always constrict people’s 
identities when they seek recognition ignores the diverse reasons that groups may pursue 
recognition in the first place, and the ways that groups operate. There may be a significant 
disparity between the way that recognition affects groups who earn new rights and 
individuals whose ability to exercise new rights may still be abridged by other social 
identities or material positions. Furthermore, conflating the different motivations behind 
group action denies the many valid goals different groups might wish to pursue in seeking 
recognition. To that end, it may be illuminating to separate recognition demands into two 
broad categories, distinguishing between those groups who seek to maintain cultural 
separation and those who seek to join with a pre-existing state.  
 
Separatist Recognition 
Groups seeking separatist recognition – the Quebecois and indigenous nations are oft-
used examples – do not seek equal rights with the citizens of their parent country. Rather, 
they seek to form distinct, self-governing territories in which they will be able to sustain a 
thick cultural tradition.
39
 These groups seek recognition to be able to separate from the 
cultural norms and expectations of the nations that they have been a part of, to be recognized 
as culturally distinct and given leeway to create their own apparatuses of law, culture, and 
even internal systems of recognition. 
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These cases seem most likely to realize some of Markell’s worst fears about 
recognition. States may deny groups the ability to exit, and use their deference to state 
sovereignty to entrap and demean them. Already recognized nations seeking to hang on to 
the resources of those who seek independence may exhibit a “heighten[ed] indifference, or 
even hostility, towards other possibilities of existence”,
40
 especially when losing this control 
is tantamount to an admission of historical wrongdoing or comes with economic 
consequences. These states have both psychological and economic motivation to deny 
recognition.  
But this is not binding by recognition so much as binding by misrecognition, or 
refusal to recognize. It is not conditional inclusion that is most dangerous here. Rather than 
binding, inclusion would give groups purchase on the process through which they could 
propose legislation or ballot initiatives, or make appeals to international actors for 
intervention. It is the cultural and legal ghettoizing of groups that is most dangerous and 
disabling. And in these instances, it is easy to see why Markell has much reluctance about 
recognition.
41
  
However, even in cases where groups are constrained by the state, that circumstance 
does not have to continue into perpetuity. Groups may continue to make cultural and political 
appeals, may create a political climate that convinces their fellow members of the state to 
consider their claims. They may continue to argue for the recognition that will allow them to 
                                                     
40
 Markell, Bound by Recognition, 175. 
 
41
 Though the term “recognition” seems misleading here. In this set of cases it does not seem that the issue is 
that recognition offers only nominal autonomy or comes with conditions that limit groups’ independence. 
Rather, these are cases of misrecognition or denied recognition. While “Bound by Mis- or Partial Recognition” 
would be a considerably less enticing title for Markell’s book, it seems that in these cases it might be more 
accurate; even in the case of Prussian Jews it seems that Markell is recounting a misrecognition that offered 
some legal rights predicated on the state’s belief that Jew were dangerous, rather than a recognition that 
acknowledged the equal humanity and cultural validity of Jewish people.  
28 
 
separate and gain autonomy, so that they are bound by neither the sovereign state nor its 
vision of them and so that they can avoid the pressures to assimilate that may destroy cultural 
traditions over time.  
Though Markell may be right to be wary of state intervention in some separatist 
cases, it is hard to imagine his politics of acknowledgement having much effect in these 
cases. If realized, acknowledgement might incline those who govern these groups to allow 
recognition-seekers to exit the state without resistance. This may be where the idea of a 
politics of acknowledgement is most powerful and appealing; Markell is probably right that 
much pain and suffering could be avoided if states would relinquish control over groups who 
seek independence without a fight. But it remains hard to imagine – and historically, it has 
rarely, if ever, been the case – that people who live in French Canada or Australia or the U.S. 
would voluntarily cede power and resources as a result of changed thinking alone. 
Furthermore, it is hard to see how opinion would change, or how changed opinion would 
lead to action, if groups seeking recognition were not able to make their appeals to fellow 
citizens matter by appealing to a shared state. Even when opinions change and people 
become more willing to accept the possibility that cultural groups should be able to self-
determine, little tangible change occurs without prompting from these groups, and it would 
be hard to know exactly what demands the group sought to have fulfilled if the state did not 
act as a shared site for demand-making and listening.
42
 While a politics of acknowledgement 
might remove aspects of antagonism and would (if achieved) expedite the historical process, 
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it is hard to see how it could come to pass, and how it could meet the needs of groups who 
lack a way to draw attention to their interests outside of the state. 
 
Integrationist Recognition 
While some seek independence from the state, others hope to join with the state’s 
decision making bodies to gain rights that are equal to those of privileged groups, usually 
majorities. While integrationist requests do, like separatist requests, ask that the state 
recognize multiple life ends as valid, appeals for integrated recognition do not necessarily 
require that groups have autonomy or rights separate from their fellow citizens, and requests 
aimed at changing group autonomy or rights tend to focus on expanding pre-existing legal 
protections (i.e., the right to vote or marry) rather than creating new legal structures or 
territories.
 43
  These appeals may also be more cognizant of group members’ multiple, 
intersectional identities and move forward in ways that don’t require members of the group to 
identify solely or primarily by the group’s shared categories.  
There are several reasons why integrationist requests might be both more welcome 
and more successful in modern liberal democratic states. Unlike the Prussian Empire, many 
of these states profess a philosophical, normative belief in inclusion and equality, either 
through having a bill of rights or signing on to international conventions. While this most 
certainly is not always the leading force behind government action (and is not always present 
in practice), the ability of groups to hold the government to this norm is powerful on multiple 
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counts. It gives groups a rationale on which to leverage limited rights into a more complete 
conception of rights. And it allows groups to fight back against the possibility that Markell 
fears, that they will be constrained by requests for recognition, because it puts the power to 
define and refine requests for recognition into the hands of group members, with the 
assurance that rights are not to be passively received at the whim of a distant and powerful 
state. Instead, the fight for integrationist recognition is an ever-evolving conversation that 
group members are able to actively help formulate. More practically, integrationist requests 
present less of a threat to the state, which may be forced to reorganize power structures, but 
does not have to altogether relinquish the human and natural resources that constituent 
groups control.  
When responding to integrationist requests for recognition the liberal democratic state 
can, in contrast with Markell’s fears, allow multiple visions of success to flourish. Groups 
making integrationist demands join with the state and may, in the process, reinscribe state 
power. But they also change the composition of that power. The admission of groups making 
integrationist demands, or expansions of rights intended to include them, have been 
responsible for changing agendas and compelling others to prioritize group needs differently. 
The state’s reaction to such dynamic demands for recognition suggests that, contra Markell, 
the substance of recognition demands and the active participation of groups seeking 
recognition can keep the state’s role in granting recognition from being binding.  
The flourishing of multiplicity can, itself, be seen as a sign of success for groups who 
make dynamic recognition demands. It would be strange to argue that the United States’ 
gradual and progressive recognition of black citizens, female citizens, and gay citizens has 
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bound those groups to one singular image or way of life.
44
 Nevertheless, While Markell 
worries that “multicultural exchanges of recognition risk overlooking – indeed, risk drawing 
attention away from – some of the deeper relations of power and forms of subordination that 
underlie the very injustices they are meant to combat”
 45
 integrationist requests tend to lay the 
groundwork for further political and cultural work intended to curb injustices. Responses to 
these requests may attempt to limit or constrain identities – to, as per Markell, bind by 
recognition. And conservative groups may be successfully in enshrining misrecognition into 
law, with devastating effects for members of affected groups. But political victory gives 
groups seeking dynamic recognition another tool with which to expand others’ views of who 
they are, more chance of becoming an equal part of the state, and more opportunity to present 
their multiplicity to their fellow citizens. Granting groups the right to vote, the right to move 
freely, the right to practice their preferred religion, the right to work, the right to marry does, 
at each step, expand the options open to individuals, as well as the group’s claim (internally 
and to outside audiences) for their worth, and human equality. These political moves open 
the door to future demands, which will have a stabler grounding at each step along the way.  
Furthermore, even if it wanted to bind through a conditional offer of recognition, 
when faced with dynamic requests for recognition the state cannot account for and constrain 
every variation on identity. State apparatuses cannot hold groups to static standards. Even if 
they try, even if they succeed in restricting exploratory spaces to the margins of social 
movements, activists have repeatedly proven their ability to move agendas and cultural 
beliefs and leverage limited recognition into more inclusive and expansive political 
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platforms. For example, a group might make an integration request for expanded 
enfranchisement or the ability to run for political office. This request, if granted, expands the 
options available to group members – they may now be able to lobby elected officials, form 
more powerful interest groups, run for office locally and nationally, take part in public 
political debates with mainstream candidates, receive federal campaign funds, to, if elected, 
gain the ear of fellow officials and propose legislation that would further enshrine or expand 
that groups rights – but does not have to bind them to a static identity. These requests are not, 
perhaps cannot be, granted on the contingency that all members of the group view their 
identity the same way or that they all agree on what it means to be black or female or gay in 
the U.S. Voting rights could not be granted only to women who agree to continue to be 
homemakers, the right to run for office could not be extended only to those African 
Americans who agreed to work as manual laborers, marriage rights cannot be extended only 
to gay people who agree to assign partners to traditional gender roles within the marriage. 
Rather, once granted, these rights give members of minority groups new purchase on 
communal life and new opportunities to place demands on state institutions, whether as 
voters, representatives, federal taxpayers, or private individuals. Integrationist recognitions 
cannot bind identities, even though they recognize that membership in the state is desirable 
and defer to and reinforce the state’s power.  
And, again, it is difficult to imagine how Markell’s politics of acknowledgement 
could offer a more powerful remedy than a politics of recognition, even though the latter may 
be antagonistic and imperfect. Would those in power be expected to use their newfound 
humility and empathy to represent the interests of newly recognized groups whose 
oppression they have never experienced? Would they be expected to abdicate positions of 
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power? Does Markell’s demand that we acknowledge finitude and embrace vulnerability 
extend to those who are all too familiar with both, and ask them to put political demands 
aside altogether? While appeals for recognition may not always be welcomed or successful, 
they at least affirm the agency of those who make requests and engage in politics, and come 
with a possibility of action that acknowledgement denies.  
 
Recognition as Progressive Remedy  
Driven by his conviction that the state will subsume agency, Markell advises groups 
seeking recognition to avoid the state. He reads “multicultural exchanges of recognition as 
instruments through which many contemporary states and their citizens attempt to 
reconstruct sovereign agency.”
46
 While he concedes that modern states are more genuinely 
sensitive to the demands of minority groups, and that government intervention “may still 
result in genuine improvements in the conditions of life of some of the people and groups it 
aims to benefit” ultimately the state’s “capacity to respond productively to injustice will be 
importantly limited.”
47
 These limits are not negligible. They include the risk of overlooking 
“some of the deeper relations of power and forms of subordination that underlie the very 
injustices that they are meant to combat”
48
, creating “an impoverished understanding of the 
nature and sources of the injustices we condemn”
49
, and leaving  “beneficiaries subject…to 
the perpetually needy and often suspicious gaze of the state and its normative citizens, 
dependent on their continued good will” such that groups are “vulnerable to sudden swings in 
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the national mood.”
50
 While some of these concerns may hold weight – certainly, the needs 
of minority groups have been used as fodder in elections, and national mood about issues like 
gender, racial equality, and sexual orientation have bearing on what progress is made – they 
also neglect positive historical moments when the state has enforced civil rights or passed 
legislation expanding rights and protections for vulnerable citizens, largely in response to 
popular movements built around integrationist recognition demands.  
Markell’s assumption that ameliorating injustice now, through the state, must lead to 
a shallower exploration of systematic injustice or others’ identities creates a false tradeoff.  
While something would surely be lost if we never examined the ways in which privilege (or 
lack of same) structures lives, there is no reason to think that extending rights and recognition 
would limit those conversations. Surely Markell cannot convincingly argue that the increased 
attention to the recognition demands of people of color, women, and gay people in the U.S. 
over the last half century has served to decrease the attention paid to inequality, or made 
collective understanding more superficial. It is hard to imagine that, in the U.S., white, male, 
Christian faculty acting alone would have pushed for the creation or popularization of 
women’s studies or critical race theory, or that white male Christian legislators would have 
advocated for civil rights and equal pay acts without pressure from interest groups organized 
around fights for recognition. What reason would they have had to prioritize these 
conversations over those more meaningful to their own life flourishing? How would they 
have the knowledge about other groups to write syllabi or legislation?  Conversely, 
legislative research has shown that once they become a part of legislative bodies female and 
black legislators are more likely to introduce legislation advocating for issues specific to their 
communities, changing conversations and pushing their peers to reconsider legislative 
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priorities.
51
 Conversations about “deeper relations of power and forms of subordination”
52
 
have flourished as historically disadvantaged groups have gained recognition – even the 
partial, incomplete recognition that Markell would rather avoid.  
If Markell is worried that the “beneficiaries” of recognition will be subject to “sudden 
swings in the national mood”
 53
 it may be of some comfort to find that beneficent conferral of 
rights is neither the whole story nor the end of a conversation.
 
While groups do, as Markell 
implicitly concedes, benefit from increased state recognition, calling them “beneficiaries” is 
an unfortunately flat choice of words. Recognition is not tantamount to a charitable handout, 
it is not a one-time offering that can be easily revoked at the whim of the majority. While it is 
certainly true that lawmakers have, after periods of reform, made serious and successful 
attempts to restrict minority rights (as with Jim Crow laws in the post-Reconstruction South) 
the legal inclusion of minority groups has expanded the philosophical and legal grounds that 
disadvantaged groups use to fight back against these new forms of control. On this model 
extending recognition does not, as Markell suggests, foreclose the possibility of deeper 
conversation about the root causes of injustice. Rather, it opens the legal and cultural door to 
those who are most capable, and have the most reason, to instigate and pursue those 
conversations. There is no reason to think, as Markell suggests, that a “genuine improvement 
in the conditions of life” for minorities will create “an impoverished understanding…of the 
injustices we condemn.”
54
 In fact, quite the opposite. 
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Gay Rights Movements: A Case for Progressive Recognition 
The history of gay and lesbian politics in the U.S. provides a particularly rich and 
timely example of the ways in which recognition – even when it is conditional or limited – 
can be a basis for building progressively towards expanded legal and social recognition, 
rather than binding groups to one ill-fitting identity. Activists in the U.S. gay rights 
movement have appealed to the state for recognition in the form of economic and legal rights 
and, in the process, have recognized the state as the ultimate arbiter of recognition, and 
citizenship as a starting point for advocacy.
 55
 And the example may be particular interesting 
in reference to Bound by Recognition because gay rights movements have not been 
successful at establishing equal legal rights or social status. The piecemeal success of these 
movements – as seen in the creation of protections specifically for gay and lesbian people 
and the expansion of pre-existing legal and cultural institutions (marriage, parenthood) to 
include gay and lesbian people in some U.S. states – have created a particular, but limited, set 
of rights
56
, which continues to exclude many, often with devastating effects. As Markell 
suggests many U.S. states do use their sovereignty, built in part on the citizenship of gay 
people, to deny recognition. But, contra Markell’s theory, gay rights movements have built 
on even limited successes to expand rights and social approval. 
In an era where the fight for marriage equality takes central stage it is easy to forget 
how persecuted gay people have been in U.S. history. While same-sex sex and sexual 
attraction were discussed at times, gay sex was a capital offense in some British colonies, and 
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gay and lesbian sex was explicitly forbidden in others. Well into the 20
th
 century gay people 
were decried and pathologized as perverts, corrupters, child molesters, and psychopaths. Gay 
people were subject to incarceration, forced hospitalization, and blacklisting. Their 
relationships and social lives were hidden, and being outed could mean that losing 
employment (still the case in many U.S. states), losing parental rights, being forced to 
register as a sex offender, and being subject to disparately violent and abusive treatment 
within the criminal justice system.
 57
 And none of these consequences have ever been strictly 
legal. The demonization of gay people has translated into an intense social stigma that has led 
those with non-traditional attractions to experiences of shame, desperation, and alienation. 
Gay people may be encouraged (or forced by family) to attend therapy meant to “correct” 
them, they may be told to keep their sexualities hidden, may see themselves depicted in the 
media as dangerous, less than, or other. This social and legal misrecognition penetrated 
across social groups and centuries, creating psychic, economic, social, legal, and physical 
harm for people with same-sex attraction in the U.S.
58
  
Yet, gay people organized – or, rather, made their social organizations public and 
political. By the 1950’s the Mattachine Society and Daughters of Bilitis were printing 
newsletters and otherwise catalyzing political action within gay communities. As other 
identity movements took center stage in American politics in the 1960s, gay rights advocates 
both borrowed from and developed calls for recognition that were predicated on an innate 
equal human worth and right to dignity. Gay rights leader embraced a politics that was 
overtly political, even politically violent at times. Many of their ends were cultural – 
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campaigns encouraged gay people to come out to those around them in order to make 
homosexuality more visible, and in 1973 activists succeeded in convincing the American 
Psychiatric Association to remove homosexuality from the list of psychological illness in its 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Other ends were more explicitly 
political. Building on increasing social legitimacy, gay rights advocates entered the state and 
introduced bills to target discrimination based on sexual orientation. In 1975, Massachusetts 
elected the country’s first openly gay congressperson. In 1978, gay rights advocates in 
California organized against Proposition 6, which would have banned gay people from being 
teachers, and the proposition lost a popular vote by a large margin.
59
 In even a relatively 
short period of time, gay rights advocates were able to fight back more and more effectively 
against social and political forces of misrecognition. As they succeeded, the makeup of the 
state began to change. With increasing social approval, openly gay legislators and judges 
were able to work from within state apparatuses. Gay rights groups were able to move from 
being shadowy social organizations to being economically and politically powerful forces for 
change. This change has accelerated in the last ten years, as increasing numbers of states 
make marriage available to same-sex couples, make discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation in housing and employment illegal, and give legal protection to same-sex couples 
who are parenting jointly. Cultural change is also afoot, with popular entertainment 
increasingly depicting gay and lesbian relationships.
60
 For the first time, in 2010, a majority 
of U.S. Americans polled expressed moral approval of gay and lesbian relationships, and 
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rates of support for gay marriage and for allowing members of the military to be openly gay 
have both increased.
61
   
This listing of victories is not to say that the struggle for gay rights has been entirely 
successful. GLBT youth are more likely to be harassed in school than their straight 
counterparts and are more likely to be homeless.
62
 30 of the 50 states do not prohibit housing 
discrimination, 29 do not prohibit employment discrimination, 29 states have constitutional 
amendments banning same-sex marriage, and an additional 12 states have laws in place to 
restrict marriage to pairs with one male and one female.
63
 But over time, the movement itself 
has expanded and splintered. It has engaged allies in larger numbers and from diverse groups. 
It has changed attitudes and laws. And it shows no sign of stopping, especially as the public 
expresses more and more acceptance of and support for the movement. And this momentum 
is, in part, what makes gay rights movements a prime example of the way in which fights for 
recognition can succeed by building on previous recognition gains, and can do so without 
becoming tied to one particular identity.  
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Furthermore, gay rights movements have helped to birth queer politics, which devote 
great attention to the subtle structural injustices that Markell thinks may be lost if recognition 
is granted. Queer theorists, building on gay culture and identity politics, have questioned the 
tangible effects of state regulation, have challenged understandings of even the most 
seemingly fundamental social structures – concepts like “sex” which might otherwise be 
taken for granted, and have developed a mode of questioning that has been adopted across 
both national and disciplinary boundaries. Queer politics also integrates questions of race, 
class, education, and other forms of social power into the fabric of most every political 
concern, bringing an attention to intersectionality that makes it difficult to define queerness 
in a way that could be bindable. Yet the political viability of a transformative queer politics 
that questions institutions and resists state authority would be unthinkable without the 
forerunning movement for gay rights. Not only has the fight for recognition in the gay rights 
movement led to a mitigation of oppression and its effects, it has generated a deep 
interrogation of state power instead of, as Markell fears, superseding it.  
A demand or fight for recognition cannot, by nature, exist in a vacuum. Members of 
gay groups demanded affirmation for their particular identities from somewhere – in this case 
from the straight majority who have, over time, been reassured that the life paths represented 
by gay identity politics are not abhorrent or dangerous and that they do not require sacrifices 
– including the sort of sacrifices that Markell’s politics of acknowledgement would demand – 
from the majority. Continuing to recognize the sovereignty of the state and the non-
negotiability of democratic processes reassures those who are being asked to grant 
recognition. Rather than demanding that pre-existing systems transform, seeking recognition 
for non-heterosexual identities has made it possible for majorities to adjust to the idea that 
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gay particularity does not overwhelm human commonality and that non-heterosexual 
individuals are deserving of rights. If some people are, now, more willing to offer recognition 
to gay and lesbian people it is because fights for recognition built on one another. And if 
some people are, now, more willing to recognize queer identities and engage in queer 
questioning of state institutions – which challenges both the right of the state to exclude (as 
with the denial of pre-existing employment protections to non-heterosexual people) and the 
breadth of state activity (as when asking is marriage, as opposed to civil unions, should ever 
be the purview of the state) – it is because the fight for recognition paved the way for deeper 
questioning. These successes have occurred because the fight for recognition behaved exactly 
as Markell fears, by reassuring powerful groups who control the state that they can maintain 
their sense of self-determination.
64
   
This case is not anomalous. It is not as though any enduring injustice levied against a 
particular group has been remedied in one go. Groups demand recognition because they are 
suffering, because they need to increase their political, economic and cultural resources. 
Fortunately, humans are, time and again, able to levy even the smallest recognition in order 
to assert “new” ways of living as equally valid, a move that still designates groups as 
particular but begins to move towards transformation. Once these alternate ways of life 
become familiar, and are seen as culturally valid by the people and institutions who have 
been in a position to offer or refuse recognition, groups can begin to move towards a deeper 
political equality. Group members may become a part of the state, may make their voices 
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heard within state agencies in order to change agendas and create the expectation that higher 
standards of inclusion should become the norm.  
It is hard to see how these ends could have been achieved without engaging the state, 
even when it has meant extending state power and affirming the state’s role as ultimate 
arbiter of rights, and even when it means that life has not improved for all gay and lesbian 
people in all parts of the country. But even as this change is incomplete, it hardly seems that 
a politics of acknowledgement would be as effective in creating real change for those 
affected.  There is every reason to believe that the state would assume sovereignty even 
absent explicit appeals for recognition, as states actively regulated gay people and 
relationships for centuries preceding any explicit rights claim from gay activists. If gay 
people had not declared that their ability to exercise personal sovereignty was unequal to that 
of their straight counterparts, if they had not approached the state to demand protections, if 
they had not used actively political strategies like protests, political campaigning, and interest 
group formation to ply the ears of their straight fellow citizens, it is hard to imagine what 
would have prompted straight people in the U.S. to change their views on these issues. For 
that matter, it is hard to imagine what would have prompted straight people to pay any 
attention to these issues at all – to discuss them, debate them, right stories about them. And 
even if it could have happened – even if a majority of heterosexual U.S. citizens woke up one 
morning with the firm belief that gay people are fully human and deserving of rich, free lives 
– it is hard to know what impact that would have on gay people. Without a way to set the 
agenda, to use political venues to affirm the importance of mutual respect, without a way to 
ensure that those who were not in touch with their finitude and vulnerability would not 
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intervene in the pursuit of these free, rich loves, it seems unlikely that any change – even 
change that is piecemeal and incomplete – would have come to fruition.  
 
Conclusion: Between Recognition and Acknowledgement 
While Markell’s politics of acknowledgement fails to account for concerns both 
theoretical and practical, his desire to improve on theories of recognition remains relevant. 
Markell is attentive to the role of individuals within political systems, moves away from the 
idea that broad and inherently biased judgments must be the basis for group rights, and takes 
care to question the structural underpinnings that can multiply the power behind legal and 
political abuses. But neither recognition nor acknowledgement offers a satisfactory path 
forward.  
Theories of recognition offer greater potential for action but, especially in 
integrationist cases, the possible actions are often problematically overbroad and reductionist. 
Markell’s politics of acknowledgement is so careful to avoid these pitfalls that it forecloses 
the possibility of productive collective action and ignores the real advantages that can come 
from even limited and contingent conferral of recognition. The options, then, are to accept 
that a certain amount of harm will come to group members and individuals, or to wait for a 
more perfect result that may never arrive.  
For all that Markell’s model is admirable, the harm of waiting, the harm of hoping 
that those in power will cede it without any way to push for that result, outweigh the dangers 
of an imperfect improvement. At least a partial recognition can be a tool for further 
advocacy. At least it can ameliorate some harms for some people. At least the exercise of 
fighting for rights can, on its own, give groups and group members something that 
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acknowledgement cannot: the ability to affirm their agency, to assert the importance of their 
voice, to join together and experience cohesion and community through the fight for psychic 
and material benefits. And in this way, the act of fighting against the state wards off some of 
what Markell fears, especially as those demanding recognition become more aware and 
critical of the force of administrative power and question state norms as part of their political 
activism.
65
  
Rather than foregoing recognition, as Markell suggests, a mindfulness of all those 
things that Markell groups together under the umbrella of “acknowledgement” may co-exist 
with and improve discourse around recognition demands. We can ask that political actors 
accept their inability to control cultural trends or other people’s desires without asking them 
to confront deeply entrenched psychological fears and habits of domination. We can ask 
those engaged in discourse around multiculturalism to accept that judging other cultures is an 
act of domination without asking them to avoid the urge to judge altogether. We can accept 
that in a globalizing world large-scale cultural homogeneity is largely a thing of the past 
without having to forego an attachment to our traditions. We can accept that difference can 
be uncomfortable without being harmful, and that discomfort is not a license to exercise 
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personal sovereignty at others’ expense. We can accept that some change is not as deeply 
structural and thoughtful as would be ideal without foregoing the intermediate victories that 
make life more livable. 
Many of these shifts are in line with Markell’s call to rethink political imaginaries. 
But unlike his argument in Bound by Recognition they recognize the positive historical 
legacy of a politics that can be antagonistic, imperfect, and at times unsatisfying. They 
recognize the importance of advocacy as a personal and political act, and the urgency with 
which change is needed. They also attempt to reconcile the importance of deep change to 
institutions and discourses with the necessity of creating change as soon as is possible for 
those who suffer from the effects of exclusion, denigration, and prejudice. And while 
Markell’s politics of acknowledgement has much to offer, a combination of other approaches 
admits a possibility that may be still more appealing: that as members of political 
communities and as humans in need of recognition, we can build on the growth we have 
achieved and create a more just world without having to first pursue personal perfection – 
that we can strive for more without doing less.  
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